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I WISH to comment on that section of Professor Murvar's excellent 
paper which discusses the Weberian thesis that "traditional" Japa-
nese Herrschaft, in common with the Herrschaft of "traditional" 
China, may be characterized as patrimonial-prebendary in spite of 
the existence of certain feudal features peculiar to the specific Japa-
nese situation.1 
This view of pre-industrial Japanese Herrschaft essentially is 
one that considers Japanese society as similar to the societies which 
arose in continental East Asia, with minor concessions granted to 
the uniqueness of all individual societies. I wish to dissent. I hasten 
to add immediately that I firmly believe that the patrimonial con-
cept is useful, even essential, for an understanding of continental 
Asian societies, especially Chinese society, and hence, by developing 
the concept, Weber made a valuable contribution both to sociology 
and to the field of Asian studies. But, in converse to the specific 
Weberian thesis cited here, I would suggest that Japanese society, 
rather than being considered as patrimonial-prebendary, is better 
interpreted as feudal with the same essential structure as that of 
other feudal (especially western European) societies. 
One of the paramount assumptions of Weber's two major works 
on Asian religion 2 is that the religious systems of China and India 
must be treated as integral elements in respective social systems 
which are conceptualized as ideal-typical. The only variations over 
time which are significant are those which violate the logical limits 
of tolerance established by the range of concern of the ideal-typical 
system. The range of concern in the present discussion, of course, 
are those influences which pertain to patrimonialism versus feudal-
ism. For example, in Chinese society, Weber would maintain that 
1 For further general discussion of the problem of feudalism in Jai^nese society, 
see R. Colbourn, Feudalism in History (Princeton, N.J., 1956), pp. 26-48, 188-214. 
2 The Religion of China (Glencoe, 111., 1951); and The Religion of India (Chi-
cago, 1958). 
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the range of tolerance was exceeded at the changeover from a feudal 
to a patrimonial type of social organization about the year 200 B.C.3 
But, since subsequent changes in Chinese society, significant as they 
may be, did not alter the basic patrimonial-prebendary structure of 
Chinese Herrschaft, such changes are not of consequence for the 
problem at hand. If change in Chinese society is interpreted in this 
way, it is apparent that Weber did not consider Chinese (or any) 
society as being "static"; certainly even a superficial thumbing of 
his monograph on Chinese religion attests this. But it does suggest 
that, for certain theoretical purposes, it may be more useful to 
ignore certain kinds of change and emphasize certain kinds of con-
sistency, in effect to conceptualize a society not as a singular mo-
ment in time, contemporary or historical, or as a series of discrete 
singular moments, but as an ideal-typical construct with certain 
select, consistent characteristics, irrespective of changes that may 
have taken place in that society over time. This view of course, does 
not preclude the possibility that these consistent characteristics may 
change, as highlighted by the preceding discussion of Chinese so-
ciety. 
This approach to the study of a society, like all sociological ap-
proaches, has as many problems as it has virtues. For one, it obvi-
ously enfuriates the chronologically conscious historian, and legiti-
mately so—if one is interested in chronological development. Never-
theless, I do believe that this method is essential for certain soci-
ological purposes, especially for the present problem of determining 
the nature of Japanese Herrschaft and its influence on the develop-
ment of Japan in the last few centuries. For I would argue, first, that 
when certain characteristics in a society are selected to represent 
that society in the analysis of a theoretical problem such as the pres-
ent one (a routine sociological procedure, to note), this method 
helps to insure that the selected traits are not atypical of the funda-
mental ideal-typical design. This consideration, I suggest, is impor-
tant, especially if the entire context of the study is limited to only 
one historical moment, on grounds that this is the very time in which 
a particular social drama has or has not occurred. For I would argue 
that, especially in such a case, the method may provide a superior 
guide in the selection of those very characteristics which logically 
must be the measure of difference for determining why a particular 
event did or did not occur in that society. 
The Religion of China, Chapter II. 
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Unfortunately neither Weber4 nor certain of his followers as, 
for example, Robert Bellah,5 in writing on Japanese religion and so-
ciety, have followed this methodological design. Rather, they have 
concentrated almost exclusively on one period of Japanese history, 
namely, that period which covered the two and a half centuries im-
mediately prior to the modern industrial era, termed the Tokugawa 
era. Logically, it cannot be denied that this period is crucial to the 
major problem raised by Weber, namely, the development of mod-
ern industrial capitalism in Japan, for no other reason than that the 
period immediately preceded the era of modern capitalism, and 
hence, whatever happened to bring about the establishment of mod-
ern capitalism must have happened in this period. Yet, I would sug-
gest that this limited approach may not be the most rewarding 
means to explain the origins of modern capitalism in Japanese so-
ciety. And I would suggest that it was this unusual approach to 
the Japanese case by Weber and his followers, perhaps out of a 
desire to demonstrate that self-generated modem industrial capital-
ism was unique to the West, that gave rise to the patrimonial-pre-
bendary thesis. If one follows the guidelines of the India and China 
studies, taking into account the full sweep of Japanese pre-industrial 
society, I suggest (1) that the patrimonial features are atypical, 
while the feudal features are typical, of the fundamental assumptions 
of pre-industrial Japan viewed as an ideal-typical system, and (2) 
that it was the typical feudal and not the atypical patrimonial fea-
tures that were the contributors to the success of the break-through 
of Tokugawa society and the establishment of modern industrial 
capitalism in Japan, which is compatible with Weber's general thesis 
of the origin of modern industrial capitalism. 
4 Weber never made a thorough study of the religious system of Japanese society 
comparable to his works on Chinese and Indian societies. This may very well be at 
the root of the present problem. Only scattered fragmentary observations on Japanese 
religion and society exist throughout his work, notably in his study of Herrschaft as 
discussed in Professor Murvar s paper. The nearest to a systematic essay of which 
I am aware is a short discussion, primarily of Buddhism, in the India volume, Col-
bourn, op. cit., pp. 270-82. 
5 To be sure, Bellah in Tokugawa Religion (Glencoe, 111., 1957), p. 178, ex-
plicitly states tliat he wishes to limit the study of Japanese religion to one historical 
period, the Tokugawa era (1C03-1868), which immediately preceded the initial 
period of the modern industrial era, the Meiji era (1868-1912); and certainly that is 
his privilege. But what are the necessary and sufficient conditions in Tokugawa society 
that explain the success of the subsequent industrial development of the Meiji era? 
Bellah and I disagree on these conditions, in part, I suggest, because of the difference 
in the time span we have chosen to serve as the model against which to select and 
interpret the universe of the empirical evidence. 
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The second major methodological consideration which prompts 
me to suggest that Japanese Herrschaft should not be considered 
as patrimonial is that I believe it is important logically to differen-
tiate between the concepts "cultural" and "social" as well as, within 
the concept "social," between "form" (or "structure") and "func-
tion." e I would say that all these distinctions are significant in the 
Japanese case, because I believe it is from the social-functional 
standpoint that Japanese society not only may very well be quali-
tatively different from patrimonial Chinese society but also that it 
may be similar to the feudal societies of western Europe.7 Conse-
quently, although I freely concede that many of the formal features 
of Tokugawa Japan were similar to those of patrimonial China, this 
similarity does not necessarily imply that Japanese society, viewed 
as a dynamic functional system, was patrimonial nor, on that ac-
count, that Japanese society is to be differentiated qualitatively from 
the western European feudal societies.8 
Within these basic methodological guidelines I would interpret 
the nature of Japanese, especially Tokugawa, Herrschaft and society 
as follows: 9 
1. In accord with the fundamental assumptions of Japanese 
Herrschaft accepted since the seventh century, the Tokugawa, as its 
predecessors, legitimized its general right to that Herrschaft on the 
6 1 would define the "cultural" as the patterned products of man, material and 
nonmaterial; in the present discussion, the nonmaterial, or symbolic, aspect is prime. 
In contrast, the "social" may be defined as the relationships between human beings. 
The distinction, to be sure, is logical, and since both the cultural and the social are 
constructs derived from human behavior, they may very well be interrelated in any 
particular study. But in the present instance, for reasons to be discussed subsequently, 
I am arguing that they need not be interrelated. Conceptualized on a very general 
level, which I trust will avoid controversy, "form" may be defined as answer to the 
question, "How does it look?" and "function" as answer to the question, "How does 
it work?" Again the two constructs may be interrelated in any analysis, but they need 
not be, and I wish to argue that, in the case presently under discussion, they are not 
7 1 have argued this in greater detail in my Origin of Modern Capitalism and 
Eastern Asia (Hong Kong, 1958). 
8 John W. Hall, as cited in Murvar's paper, has argued for the uniqueness of 
Japanese feudalism. Certainly this is important for understanding the singular nature 
of Japanese society and the particular path which it has taken in the development 
of modern capitalism, and I do not wish to minimize that uniqueness. But at the 
same time I must argue that this approach very well might obscure what I believe 
are important distinctions and similarities on a more general level of analysis. 
9 Detailed documentation for the following discussion may be found in any 
standard history of Japan, as for example, J. Murdoch's three volumed History of 
Japan, many editions, and the recent G. Sansom's three volumed History of Japan 
(Stanford, Calif., 1961-63). For a more detailed treatment of my theoretical view of 
the historical material, see Jacobs, op. cit. 
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basis of an empirical demonstration of superior coordinative skill 
and military power as against all rival claimants. The Tokugawa 
legitimized its right to establish and maintain the specific Herrschaft 
that it formulated by demonstrating, in contrast to all potential 
rivals, an empirical ability to solve the existing specific problem of 
order as defined functionally at the specific historical moment when 
the Tokugawa rose to power. At the beginning of the seventeenth 
century, superior political ability implied the ability to establish a 
peaceful, unified order to replace the chaotic decentralized feudal-
ism which had prevailed through most of the previous centuries. 
This is to be contrasted with the fundamental assumptions of a 
patrimonial Herrschaft (as, for example, pre-modern Chinese Herr-
schaft) which consists of a constant structure, defined and legiti-
mized by a moral, charismatic political elite dispensing or with-
drawing political favors on grace without review to those of more 
limited political morality. 
2. Yet, in spite of this contrast of fundamental assumptions be-
tween Chinese and Japanese Herrschaft, it cannot be denied that 
many of the specific cultural and social forms of Tokugawa social 
order resembled those of seventeenth century China because they 
were consciously borrowed or adapted from them. Why then did 
Tokugawa Japan, if it was feudal, not look to the Herrschaft of the 
European nation-states as the source or inspiration for its proposed 
solution to the problem of political order? Perhaps, it might be 
argued, at least Tokugawa Herrschaft, if not Japanese Herrschaft in 
general, was patrimonial? I would suggest that although the features 
of the developed feudalism and rising national states of the West 
were known to the Japanese, and although certain features of Euro-
pean culture and society prompted admiration in certain Japanese 
quarters, the late sixteenth-century political experience of the Japa-
nese with the Europeans was not such as to encourage emulation 
as far as statecraft was concerned. On the other hand, because of 
continued contact over a millennium characterized by extensive 
social and cultural borrowing, China represented the known and 
the acceptable to the Japanese, especially in an age when the free-
booting West had yet to validate its claim to alleged superiority 
over the social orders of East Asia. But the Tokugawa adoption of 
Chinese social and cultural forms did not necessarily imply the adop-
tion of the functions associated with these forms in the Chinese sys-
tem, especially not the fundamental assumptions associated with 
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patrimonial-prebendarism. I would suggest further that this adop-
tion of forms but not of functions has been the pattern of Japanese 
borrowing from China since the seventh century and is one of the 
cardinal, constant measures of diflFerence between the two societies,* 
regardless of any apparent similarity in certain social and cultural 
forms.10 
3. Consequently, I suggest that whatever Chinese forms were 
introduced into Japanese society, they were legitimized and en-
forced, not on the basis of the charismatic assumptions of the Chi-
nese patrimonial system of Herrschaft, but on the basis of the prag-
matic assumptions of Japanese feudal Herrschaft. Apparently, be-
cause of the fundamental non-patrimonial assumptions of Japanese 
society, it was never in a position to institutionalize those functions 
of Herrschaft which were associated with the qualitatively alien 
system of patrimonial Chinese society. This principle was estab-
lished in the seventh century, and seventeenth-century Japan was 
not different in this respect.11 
Hence, although the Tokugawa made a valiant attempt to intro-
duce many formal features of a patrimonial-prebendary society, it 
never succeeded (any more than did any of its predecessors who 
attempted it) in introducing patrimonialism as a functional sys-
tem into Japanese society, only, I suggest, the skeletal forms of that 
system. Consequently, I conclude that the forms of patrimonial 
prebendarism that were legitimized, were established and main-
tained, not on the basis of the Chinese moral right, but upon the 
basis of the Japanese assumption of an empirically demonstrated 
ability to do so, specifically on the grounds that, in contrast to rival 
claimants, the forms were integral elements of the superior solution 
to the problem of unitary order proposed by the Tokugawa at the 
time it came into power. When in the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury it became obvious that the Tokugawa no longer was able to 
justify its alleged superiority in solving the problem of Herrschaft 
and order, and when a novel, and apparently more efficacious Herr-
schaft was proposed—importantly, in response to the dramatically 
altered functional demands of mid-nineteenth century Japanese so-
ciety—the legitimate right to hold the mantle of Herrschaft passed 
from the Tokugawa to a new claimant, the Royalists, who, consis-
10 For a detailed account of this significant characteristic in the case or Japan's 
first major borrowing from China in the seventh century, see K. Asakawa, The Early 
Institutional Life of Japan (Tokyo, 1903). 
11 Ibid., especially pp. 333-46. 
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tent with the Japanese fundamental assumptions of Herrschaft, em-
pirically demonstrated an ability to respond more successfully to 
the challenge of the new industrial era then dawning in Japan. And 
at this time, although once again many forms of Chinese society 
persisted and even new ones were introduced, Japanese society 
now was ready to accept what the West had to offer in form as well 
as in function. 
4. Account of the origin and development of the particular 
Herrschaft that destroyed the Tokugawa is of prime interest to the 
present discussion. From the very beginning of the establishment 
of the Tokugawa ascendancy, in spite of the conscious adoption of 
many formal features of the Chinese patrimonial system which was 
designed in the hopes of relieving the pressure, the Tokugawa was 
forced (once again, I would say, by the functional demands of the 
fundamental assumptions of Japanese society) to acknowledge the 
legitimacy of independent rights and privileges among centers of 
decentralized authority outside its direct control, and even to recog-
nize reciprocal rights, privileges, and obligations within its own do-
main. This concept of Herrschaft is a familiar feature of feudalism 
and may be contrasted with the localized, often illegitimate arroga-
tion of authority characteristic of patrimonial prebendarism. 
Certainly, in the early days of the Tokugawa, these decentral-
ized centers were weak as against the Tokugawa might, but be-
cause of the recognition of the legitimacy of decentralized rights 
and privileges, albeit limited, these centers were potentially ca-
pable of developing significant countervailing authority. And, his-
torically speaking, this is precisely what happened in the eighteenth 
and especially in the nineteenth century (as it, for the same reason, 
had happened again and again previously in Japanese society be-
tween a titular central authority and localized authority). This 
localized authority, especially the so-called "outside clans,"12 in-
creasingly evaded the pseudo-patrimonial agricultural taxation and 
commercial restrictive policies of the Tokugawa as it became evi-
dent that the Tokugawa, because of the Japanese fundamental as-
sumptions of Herrschaft as an empirical test of coordinative and 
military superiority, was growing steadily weaker and, hence, was 
unable to enforce its political decisions. And it was these outside 
centers of authority which spearheaded the overturn of the Toku-
" T h e "tozama" clans; see A. M. Craig, Choshu in the Meiji Restoration (Cam-
bridge, 1961), pp. 350-74. 
The Patrimonial Thesis and Japanese Herrschaft 395 
gawa Herrschaft, significantly along with the specific Tokugawa 
form of Herrschaft, replacing it with the industrial order of Meiji, 
an order more responsive to the functional demands of the new 
pragmatic situation. It is worth noting, in passing, that all this is 
in marked contrast to the fate of Chinese society in the same pe-
riod, a society which, because of the fundamental assumptions of 
patrimonialism, was unable to respond as readily as Japan to the 
functional demands of the same order of industrial challenge.13 
In conclusion, I would suggest that, certainly, it is ridiculous 
to deny that China always has had a profound effect on the forms 
of Japanese society and culture. But if one interprets the borrowing 
process from the functional point of view, I would suggest that the 
reverse of the Weberian thesis is valid, namely, that Japanese Herr-
schaft, from the seventh to the nineteenth century, may be charac-
terized as feudal, in spite of the fact that certain formal similarities 
to Chinese Herrschaft existed. This discontinuity between formal 
similarity and functional dissimilarity to Chinese Herrschaft had 
made Japanese Herrschaft a significantly different member of the 
feudal ideal-typical system but, I would claim, not a pariah of that 
system and certainly not a member of the patrimonial-prebendary 
ideal-typical system predominant in continental Asia.14 
I hasten to add that this view in no way is meant to disparage 
the patrimonial-prebendary theory; quite the contrary. I believe 
that the concept is of inestimable value as, for example, in helping 
to explain the differential receptivity to modern industrial order 
between feudal Japan and patrimonial China. And so, once again, 
one is indebted to Max Weber for still another seminal insight 
which is of utmost importance, in this case to the field of Asian 
studies as well as to sociology—further testimony to Weber's genius 
and continuing value to present-day and future research. 
13 For a fuller discussion of this see Jacobs, op. cit.; S. Y. Teng, China's Response 
to the West (Cambridge, 1954), and A. Feuerwerker, Chinas Early Industrialization 
(Cambridge, 1958). 
141 may cite K. A. Wittfogel's, Oriental Desvotism (New Haven, 1957) and 
the Japanese economist's, H. Otsuka's Kindai Shihonshugi No Keifu (The Pedigree 
of Japanese Capitalism, Tokyo, 1947), as but two examples of those influenced by 
the patrimonial-prebendary theory. 
Notes and Commentaries 
Ethical Neutrality and the Perspective of the Sociologist ^ 
Tms is the centenary of the birth of Max Weber. It is slightly more 
than forty years since he died. His seminal insights still influence 
long after his death. It would perhaps not be inappropriate to con-
sider, in the light of the present state of the discipline, a concern 
basic to the Weberian enterprise: the necessary Wertfreiheit of the 
man of knowledge. 
As elaborated in "Wissenschaft als Beruf," * Weber suggests that, 
for the sociologist, the classroom is not the place for polemics nor 
is the research undertaking a context for subjective meanderings. 
Like any professional, the sociologist is to be the "man who knows" 
—in this case about the dynamics of social conduct—and his talents 
and information are to be available, sine ire ac studio, to the person 
ready to use it in the service of good. But what good? Presumably, 
the welfare of man. But how or where is this to be defined? This 
Weber does not tell us. 
Whether the sociologist likes it or not, whether he admits it or 
not, he operates within a context of values. The acquisition of 
knowledge is in itself a value, the canons by which such knowledge 
can be acquired and disseminated is still another, and, finally, that 
the sociologist should have no values is in itself a value. Needless 
to say, these values constitute a portion of the normative framework 
by whose mandate the sociologist operates. It was not always thus. 
When Comte coined the term "sociology," he saw this domain 
not merely as a novel perspective in which to order knowledge 
about the human socius, but he saw sociology further as a tool 
through which humanity might be, as he saw it, relieved from the 
archaic prejudices and dogmas of outworn creeds, through which 
humanity might be seen as the creator, not merely the consumer, 
of ideologies (as, indeed, Bacon had argued three centuries 
earlier). That such a view of the field is now thoroughly discredited 
by sociologists does not invalidate the observation that sociology 
1 Max Weber, "Wissenschaft als Beruf," trans. "Science as a Vocation," in H. H. 
Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1946), pp. 129-56. 
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